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Three Models of Democratic Expertise 
Alfred Moore, University of York 
[Version accepted for publication in Perspectives on Politics, 21 July 2020] 
Anxieties about the place of expertise in democratic politics have become prominent in recent 
political science. However, these anxieties have too often been framed in terms of an implicit model 
of pure and unmixed expert rule or ÔepistocracyÕ. This has left us unable to ask or answer important 
questions about how expertise can best be integrated within democratic systems, and how such 
systems can cope with the central problem of enabling lay judgment of expert claims. Consider, for 
instance, the growing body of work on political ignorance, which has led to arguments for 
restricting the scope of democratic decision-making, insulating expert-led decision processes from 
popular influence, introducing knowledge-based limitations on the franchise, or, at the extreme, 
advocating an explicitly undemocratic ÔmeritocracyÕ (Achen and Bartels 2016; Bell 2015; Brennan 
2016). These approaches have been criticised for operating with an implicit notion of Ôstraw 
guardiansÕ, that is, Ôthe argument that the only alternative to perfect responsiveness is deference to a 
selected group of guardiansÕ (Sabl 2015, 354). But a parallel tendency can be found among political 
theorists. Theorists working on Ôepistemic democracyÕ, for instance, focus on the potential role of 
collective wisdom in identifying or determining truth in respect of morality or justice but bypass the 
specific problems of expertise in democratic systems by framing their arguments against a stylised 
regime of ÔepistocracyÕ (Estlund 2008).  As Hlne Landemore, for instance, puts it: Ôthe relevant 1
comparison ... is not between democracy and that technocratic branch of the government but 
between democracy and oligarchy when both are equipped with a competent technocracy of that 
kindÕ (Landemore 2013, 204). In order to contrast the regime types of ÔepistocracyÕ and ÔdemocracyÕ 
they bracket out the uses of expert knowledge within democratic systems. Similarly, research on 
 Though for important exceptions see Anderson 2006; Bohman 2006; Lane 2014; and Ober 2017.1
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process preferences has tended to treat rule by experts as an alternative way of running government 
rather than treat expertise as a crucial part of any political system that might be organised in 
different ways (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 138). Anxieties about expertise also feature 
prominently in recent political science research on the theme of populism and technocracy 
(Bickerton and Invernizzi Acetti 2015). However, while populism has been subject to detailed 
analysis within this body of work, technocracy has usually been glossed in general accounts of 
Ôexpert ruleÕ in terms of  'the centrality of rational speculation in identifying both the goals of a 
society and the means to implement them' (Caramani 2017: 54). 
Whether the concern is about experts having too little influence in democratic politics or too much, 
there remains a tendency to invoke a straw man in the form of an imagined system of pure and 
unmixed expert rule. If we assume that in complex societies reliance on expertise is unavoidable, 
valuable, and yet potentially threatening to democratic ideals, then we need to devote more attention 
to the question of how reliance on expertise is organised and how its legitimacy might be sustained. 
This involves a shift in emphasis towards a political epistemology that pays closer attention to the 
organisation of expertise in democratic systems. In developing this approach, one valuable resource 
comes from the sociology of science and science and technology studies, which have attended 
closely to the construction and contestation of expertise, and in particular drawn attention to the 
ways in which alternative claims to knowledge can be Ñ and have been Ñ marginalised in the 
production and application of expertise. There are political theorists who have already begun an 
engagement with this work, and have sought to elaborate what it would mean to do a more 
democratic politics of expertise (Brown 2009, Moore 2017, Pamuk 2018, Turner 2003). In order to 
advance these emerging critical and institutional approaches to thinking about the epistemic 
dimensions of democracy, I aim in this reflections essay to articulate three stylised models Ñ 
representative, participatory, and associational Ñ of the ways in which expertise can be engaged 
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with, contested, and contributed to by broader publics, and show the ways in which these models 
can come into tension. 
I should also note that my use of ÔmodelsÕ in this essay is in the spirit of SchellingÕs comment on the 
Ômodel as a toolÕ and a Ôhelp in communicatingÕ (Schelling 1978, 90; from Johnson 2014, 547).  2
The essay aims to show in a simplified and stylised form a number of distinct ways of organising 
relationships between citizens and experts, that is, different ways in which lay judgment can be 
engaged with expertise in ways that can be described as broadly democratic. The democratic 
models of expertise presented here do not involve claims about democracy tracking the ÔtruthÕ of 
morality or justice, but they do suppose that making expert claims subject to public judgment is 
likely to make experts both more reliable in their technical judgments and to draw out the political 
assumptions and choices embedded within technical judgments in policy domains. These models, 
finally, are not meant to be exhaustive, or exclusive. They can - and do - coexist in our 
governmental systems, and they might usefully be combined in ways that maintain their democratic 
benefits without losing their downsides.  
The reflection is organised as follows: Part 1 will address the concept of expertise, and argue for a 
shift from the common focus on how lay people can identify the genuine experts to questions of 
how lay people and experts can jointly contribute to practical reasoning about action under 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty. Parts 2-4 will analyse three ways of institutionally 
organising such practical judgment in terms of the demands they make on lay citizens, the nature of 
the epistemic contributions they draw from citizens, how they enact processes of scrutiny and 
contestation of the substance, relevance, and limits of expert claims: representative expertise, in 
which experts are taken to exercise limited and delegated power under the supervision of political 
 For a critique of the reductive use of models in democratic theory see Warren (2017).2
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representatives; participatory expertise, in which expertise is integrated with publics by means of 
new institutional participatory processes; and associative expertise, in which civil society groups, 
advocacy organisations, and social movements organise expert knowledge around the specific 
political objectives of a self-organised association. Part 5 will then discuss some of the most 
important ways in which these models may interact, support, and undermine one another. 
Expertise and the problem of judgment 
By expertise I mean the possession of special knowledge, skills or experience rooted in the 
methods, norms, practices and goals of a specific community and which is recognized as legitimate 
by the wider society. This involves an element of codified knowledge and practical experience 
recognised both by some community of peers, and by a broader public. This relational approach to 
expertise focuses attention on the audiences to which experts appeal. It also draws attention to the 
question of interestedness. In response to claims to expertise it is common to ask some version of 
the question: Ôwhose experts?Õ This sort of question invokes both the idea that expertise involves 
some special knowledge and a sense of the importance of independence. While it seems obvious to 
point to independence as a feature of expertise, what is typically at stake is in fact better described 
as divided loyalty (Schudson 2006, 499), in the sense that the expert is accountable at once to a 
community of peers and to a particular client, sponsor or institution. This divided loyalty is 
particularly salient where experts work in government to advise on and execute policies decided by 
elected representatives and become torn between sincerely reporting what the evidence and their 
experience tells them, and what their political masters want to hear.  But even in contexts associated 3
with advocacy (and thus, it would seem, a degree of overt partiality), those claiming expertise will 
 Consider, for example, the recent resignation of a criminal justice expert from the UK Home 3
OfficeÕs drug Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, on grounds that new appointments were 
being politically vetted (Busby 2019).  
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typically also be concerned to maintain credibility in the eyes of the relevant expert community Ñ 
indeed, their effectiveness may depend on this. 
This relational framing of expertise can be contrasted with a realist view of expertise as the capacity 
to make true statements about the world (Goldman 2006). The realist approach focuses on the 
Ôexpert-noviceÕ problem, that is, the question of how non-experts can correctly identify the genuine 
experts. When A claims to possess some knowledge or skill that B does not, then not only does B 
not know what A knows (or claims to know); B is also in a poor position to judge or test AÕs claim 
to expertise. There are two common responses to this problem. One is that the non-expert must 
simply become an expert, that is to say, acquire the ability to share in the reasoning of the experts 
about the matter at hand. If people are not able or willing to make this effort, then they must resign 
themselves to a position of blind deference (Wolff 1970, 17). The other approach is to focus on the 
external heuristics and cues that non-experts might use to evaluate expert claims without drawing 
on any substantive knowledge of the matter at hand. Some recent work in social epistemology has 
been optimistic about the capacity of non-experts to successfully identify the ÔrealÕ experts by 
making Ôsecond-order assessments of the consensus of trustworthy expertsÕ (Anderson 2011, 144), 
observing mutual recognition among experts in the form of professional credentials, being able to 
assess conflicts of interest, and assessing a track record of predictions (Goldman 2006). Lupia and 
McCubbins have taken a similar approach to an analogous problem of judgment in respect of 
political ignorance, arguing that people would want to see that their putative authority had made 
Ôcostly effortÕ in forming its judgments, that it would be penalised for lying, and that other entities 
would monitor and exert reputational pressure (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 53-4). This sort of 
second-order evidence of epistemic reliability might be more or less reliable as a way of identifying 
genuine experts: Brewer (1998), drawing on the example of lay assessment of expert witnesses in 
the context of jury trials, is sceptical; Goldman (1999, 271), on the other hand, argues that by 
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drawing on external cues, such as a track record, it is possible for the layperson to know that 
someone is an expert without knowing how or why.  
However, this framing of the problem of judgment has three limitations when applied to expertise in 
political contexts. First, despite different assessments of precisely how and with what reliability 
non-experts might tell genuine from spurious claims to expert knowledge, the authors above agree 
that short of becoming an expert oneself, external signs and cues are the only game in town. Yet 
even if we concede that experts and non-experts cannot fully communicate, in the sense of sharing 
in the same reasoning, it nonetheless remains possible for laypeople to judge claims to expertise. 
That is, it is possible to have rational discussion in a way that does not involve mirroring expert 
reasoning. Melissa Lane, for instance, resists the reduction of the problem of expertise to the 
problem of lay assessment of the truth of expert testimony, and argues that the central problem is 
practical judgment of expert claims in a context of uncertainty. In such contexts, the judgment that 
individuals can exercise over experts often depends on some degree of substantive engagement with 
their claims or products, even if it does not require mirroring their actual reasoning. LaneÕs account 
emphasises the engagement of a certain form of internal judgment (of the claims themselves and 
the patterns of reasoning that generated them) and its interplay with external judgments, which 
extend from credentials to track record to interests and biases, but she emphasises that few of the 
external forms are wholly free of the need of some degree of internal engagement. Thus it is 
important to emphasise that such internal engagement does not require lay people to become what 
Collins and Evans (2007, 24) call ÔcontributoryÕ experts, able to actually perform the expert practice 
in question. Rather, it involves something more like Ôinteractional expertiseÕ, which involves the 
ability to speak the language of a specialism even if one is not able to actually perform the practice 
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(Collins and Evans 2007, 28). This remains a demanding task,  but is nonetheless feasible, and 4
sufficient for making informed practical judgments on matters involving expert claims. 
Secondly, the sorts of cases that have been the focus of discussions of the Ôexpert-noviceÕ problem 
are often those in which the expert claims and their bearing on the problem at hand is clear and 
simple. Goldman, for instance, uses the example of a putative expert predicting the time of an 
eclipse. Here the novice may be unable to share in the ÔesotericÕ reasoning of the experts, which is 
to say, the Ôdomain of propositions accessible only to the expertsÕ (Goldman, 2006: 32), but is 
clearly able to judge the ÔexotericÕ claim, namely that the eclipse will happen at a particular time. 
However, while such stylised cases are clearly valuable for isolating elements of the problem of lay 
judgment of expert claims, they are a long way from the sorts of knowledge claims invoked within 
policy discussions. As Turner (2003) persuasively argues, the strict view of the impossibility of lay 
judgment of expert claims assumes cases of ÔdisciplinedÕ rationality, special forms of rational 
discussions that involve training and discipline, and self-limitations on what counts as evidence, 
characteristic of expert domains like science and law. These are, however, poor models of the way 
in which expertise is brought to bear on Ôill-structuredÕ problems in policy domains (Turner 2003, 
46-70). In these contexts what is at stake is a process of inquiry that is itself guided by choices 
about the selection and evaluation of evidence that depend in non-trivial ways on the values of the 
participants. Furthermore, even on more narrowly specified questions, while we might think a 
layperson should defer to expert testimony in order to acquire true beliefs, there is always a chance 
they will be wrong. In deciding to defer, we are thus making a choice between the costs of the claim 
being true or false Ñ we are taking on 'inductive risk' Ñ and this choice involves considerations of 
value (Douglas 2000).   
 As illustrated by CollinsÕ own struggles to ÔpassÕ in conversation as a gravitational wave physicist 4
(Collins and Evans 2007, 91-112). 
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Third, in the Ôexpert-noviceÕ framing the expert knowledge in question is implicitly conceived as a 
finished product to be transmitted to a non-expert. However, expertise in the context of Ôill-
structuredÕ problems is not a finished product; rather it is conditioned by the institutional context in 
which it is brought to bear on practical problems. Consider, for example, two people with the same 
training and experience, one working for a government health department, another working for an 
advocacy group. In each case they would retain a connection to their expert community, but might 
come to see the boundaries of that community and the nature of their expertise differently. For 
instance, a psychologist working as an autism advocate would perhaps be more likely to recognise 
the experiential expertise of the person with autism.  And from the other direction, experts working 5
in a policy context might have a narrower conception of what counts as legitimate expertise. In a 
well-known example, experts from the UKÕs agriculture ministry failed to recognise the knowledge 
possessed by farmers when considering the effects of radioactive fallout on the sheep of Cumbria in 
the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster (Wynne 1989). What is at stake in political contexts, then, is 
the process through which claims to expertise and the boundaries of legitimate expertise are 
advanced and contested. From this point of view, the question is not whether laypeople can 
correctly identify the true experts, but how the process of advancing, scrutinizing and contesting 
claims to expertise is organised. It is in response to this problem that I frame the three models of 
democratic expertise below. 
The central focus of the rest of this essay is on the different ways in which democratic systems can 
organise the weighing, scrutinising, and contestation of expert claims in the evaluation of 
alternative courses of action. Within these processes it is of course important that lay people can 
 See Pellicano et al. (2019) for a discussion of experiential expertise in the production of 5
knowledge about autism. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this example to my attention.
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learn from experts; the expert-novice problems do not go away. But in this context they take second 
place to a focus on the ways in which lay people Ñ or their representatives Ñ can gain 
Ôinteractional expertiseÕ or the capacity for practical judgment of expertise as it bears on particular 
problems and alternative courses of action. The general considerations on the practical judgment of 
expertise raised in this section Ñ that it involves a degree of ÔinternalÕ engagement, and a process of 
scrutiny and contestation Ñ can be cashed out in very different ways, involving different modalities 
of deliberation, different cognitive demands on citizens, different conceptions of the epistemic 
contribution of citizens, and different systemic effects. In the following sections I will discuss three 
schematic ways of democratically organising public judgment in respect of claims to expertise, 
through mechanisms of representation, participation, and association, before going on to analyse the 
tensions within and between them.  
Three Models of Democratic Expertise 
Representative Expertise 
Representative expertise characterises a relationship between citizens and experts mediated through 
institutions of political representation. On this model experts are taken to exercise limited and 
delegated power under the supervision of political representatives. Representative expertise as I use 
the term involves a narrow view of political representation, in which a representative is understood 
to be in a principal-agent relationship with her constituents, authorized by them and accountable to 
them through periodic elections (Urbinati and Warren 2008).  The role of political representatives 6
on this model is twofold: First, and most obviously, to provide a conduit for citizen concerns to 
 Representative relationships of course exist beyond electoral politics, and Brown (2009) and 6
Callon et al. (2010) have argued that experts themselves should be conceived as representatives. 
However, my use of the term Ôrepresentative expertiseÕ here is limited to the citizen-expert 
relationship mediated through formal electoral representation.
9
enter the process of will-formation in representative institutions; Second, to exercise powers of 
scrutiny, control and supervision over the conduct of the experts whose power they authorise.  
The first key relationship, then, is between citizens and representatives. The role of citizens in this 
model depends on how the relationship between citizens and representatives is specified, but we can 
say in general terms that the cognitive demands on citizens are light. Citizens are not expected to 
acquire a capacity to independently evaluate expert claims. Nor are they expected to become the 
more general 'informed citizenÕ invoked by epistocratic critics, incorporating the key findings of 
current economics, for instance, into their political judgments. Rather, as John Dewey put it, Ô[t]he 
man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert 
shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to remedied' (Dewey 1927, 207). Melissa 
Schwartzberg draws on Hayek to make a similar point: citizens possess local knowledge of their 
economic and social circumstances and the interests of themselves and those around them 
(Schwartzberg 2019, 3). The epistemic function of elections is to elicit this information. This means 
that the role of citizens is not to program the political system with the ÔcorrectÕ policies, either at the 
individual level or by leveraging ideas of collective wisdom, but rather to inform representatives 
more accurately about the nature and intensity of perceived problems, and to motivate them to seek 
solutions. It may be true that voters do not know much about the relative merits of particular 
policies, but on this model they do not need to. As Schwartzberg puts it, Ôeven if voters are 
uninformed, that does not mean that their votes are uninformativeÕ (2019, 20). Representative 
expertise models the epistemic contribution of citizens in terms of giving feedback on local 
circumstances and motivating the search for solutions, and leaves the control of experts to 
representatives. 
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The second key relationship in representative expertise is between representatives and experts, and 
it involves the exercise of supervision and control by means of questioning, scrutinizing, making 
demands for justification, and evaluating the responses of those exercising expert judgment. It is 
important to note that in this model the representatives are not themselves experts; rather, they are 
to Ôstand inÕ for citizens in the capacity of judging expert claims. Scrutiny of experts is a demanding 
activity requiring knowledge and experience, including in skills of disputation and argumentation, 
but representatives are nonetheless typically in the position of a layperson.  It is for this reason that 7
Max Weber recommended that parliaments should be equipped with strong and independent 
epistemic resources (Weber 1994, 179). Relatively little attention has been paid to the normative 
justification for resources for the development of expertise within parliaments.  Yet the model of 8
representative expertise suggests the importance of possible measures such as the provision of 
greater research support for the opposition, and the strengthening of specifically parliamentary 
research resources, rather than reliance on knowledge mobilised within parties. 
Participatory Expertise 
 This separation of Ôcontrol and criticismÕ from the Ôactual conduct of affairsÕ is central to MillÕs 7
discussion of expertise in his Considerations on Representatives Government (Mill 1977a [1861], 
433). See Urbinati (2002) for a discussion of the Ôwatching powerÕ exercised by representatives, and 
Moore (2014) for a discussion of the relation between criticism and expert authority in MillÕs work.
 For empirical study of this problem, see Rosen and Stie (2018), who analyse the attempts of the 8
European Parliament to Ôaim[] for independenceÕ through developing its own knowledge base with 
which to push back against the Commission. Few political theorists have directly addressed this 
issue, but PamukÕs (2018) defence of public funding of science on grounds of empowering public 
scrutiny could perhaps be developed in this direction (see also Pamuk 2019).
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Participatory expertise involves linking experts directly with publics by means of participatory 
processes, ranging from citizenÕs juries in technology assessment to minipublics designed to filter 
and integrate expert knowledge into a considered public judgment. Participatory expertise 
encompasses a wide range of different institutional designs, and differing degrees of empowerment, 
and different proposed connections to the other parts of the democratic system.  But they share a 9
commitment to the idea that under the the right conditions of deliberative organisation and support, 
ordinary citizens are perfectly capable of making informed judgments of complex expert claims.  10
The model of participatory expertise thus puts far higher cognitive demands on citizens than 
representative expertise. However, lay citizens are not expected or required to become full or 
ÔcontributoryÕ experts.  Rather, they are expected to do sufficient work to enable them to 11
effectively judge, weigh, and evaluate claims to expertise and their bearing on a broader policy 
question. In this respect there is a parallel to the representative-expert relationship described in the 
previous section, but their democratic role is quite different. 
Participatory expertise provides an alternative Ñ in a less or more radical way, that is, as a 
supplement or a direct challenge Ñ to the representative-expert relationship. The original idea of a 
'minipopulus' (later termed minipublic) that would generate informed public scrutiny of policy 
experts and generate demands for communicative justification before a wider public was outlined 
 For surveys and analysis of public engagement mechanisms in the field of science, technology and 9
the environment in particular, see Rowe and Frewer (2000); and Brown (2009). 
 Participatory expertise has often been associated with the institutional mechanism of the 10
minipublic, but this is not a necessary connection.
 Though lay citizens can clearly also be full or ÔcontributoryÕ experts in the sense of possessing 11
relevant local knowledge or experience as it bears on technical questions (Collins and Evans 2015, 
122), a possibility I will discuss further in the next section.
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by Robert Dahl in response to the fear that delegations to experts within representative systems had 
become relations of Ôquasi-guardianshipÕ (Dahl 1985, 89). In this respect, participatory expertise 
can be understood as providing a direct and non-electoral version of the sort of supervision and 
control described in the previous section. This line of thought has been developed by MacKenzie 
and Warren (2012), who argue that minipublics can both extend the participatory capacities of 
citizens by providing trustworthy information about complex policy deliberations, and influence 
conduct in the realm of administration by confronting experts with the judgments of a randomly 
selected group of informed citizens. Participatory expertise can thus be seen as a supplement to 
representative expertise, responding to weakening electoral legitimacy and the expansion of the 
executive by providing ways for expert bodies to generate non-electoral claims to democratic 
legitimacy and new lines of democratic accountability (Rosanvallon 2019).  
Participatory expertise can also be seen as part of a fully functioning alternative to representative 
government. This more radical approach has been developed by Josiah Ober, who proposes a 
system of Ôrelevant expertise aggregationÕ, in which a direct and fully inclusive decision process is 
sequenced to allow for the (transparent) identification and weighing of relevant expert opinion in 
the formation of options to be put to the full public assembly for decision. He draws on Ancient 
Athenian examples, but argues that even in a large and highly complex polity it is possible to 
imagine a direct and participatory process that would be able to identify, weigh, and evaluate claims 
to expertise. Such a process would be able to substitute Ñ at least on an occasional basis and with 
respect to particular issues Ñ for representative democracy. The possibility of such occasional 
substitution is necessary in order that delegated authority can actually be revocable. Furthermore, 
the real possibility of the Ôoccasional expedientÕ of a directly empowered coupling of experts and 
citizens would serve as a more radical check on elite capture (Ober 2017, 155) than mere 
communicative accountability. 
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Associative Expertise 
Associative expertise involves the creation, organisation, or mobilization of expert knowledge 
around the aims and purposes of a self-organised association. This can take the form of civil society 
groups, advocacy organisations, and social movements that acquire their own legitimacy as 
knowledgable and link their expertise directly to the interests of their members. Such engagement 
between experts and non-experts can take place at the level of identifying and formulating 
problems, initiating inquiries, and intervening in ongoing research programmes. The demands made 
on citizens are in some respects similar to those in representative expertise: neither the individual 
voter nor the typical member of an association needs to know all the details of any particular issue; 
the judgment of expert knowledge is undertaken by a smaller group who acquire the capacity for 
practical judgment of expertise, or even full contributory expertise, to engage with or challenge 
expert judgments, or acquire and deploy their own expertise.  
The cognitive contribution of lay citizens on this model takes the form not only of the formulation 
of new problems, but also the assessment, scrutiny and critique of existing claims to expertise. 
AIDS activists, for instance, were able to acquire and mobilize expertise on behalf of those affected 
by emerging threat of HIV-AIDS and successfully challenge what constituted Ôgood scienceÕ in 
conduct of clinical trials (Epstein 1996, 2). Callon et al. (2009: 89) note that the Ôvigilant presence 
of concerned groupsÕ in the case of the problem of storing nuclear waste Ôfosters greater prudence 
and professional consciousness on the part of the researchersÕ. It is not only a matter of capacity, 
however. It is also a matter of empowerment and motivation. Consider again the case of AIDS 
activists. Their inclusion in discussions of research protocols and the reorientation of norms of 
clinical and epidemiological research to their particular needs depended on the threat by activists to 
withhold their cooperation in drug trials. As I have argued elsewhere (2017, 108-9), Ô[t]he threat of 
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exit gave them the opportunity to exercise voice.Õ Such confrontation does not in itself answer any 
of the substantive questions about what is to be done in particular cases. The democratic value 
comes from forcing putative authorities into communicative justifications of their practices, 
including Ôeven epistemic norms of validity, reliability, and evidence' (Bohman 1999: 590). 
There are two further points to highlight with regard to associative expertise. The first is that this 
model most clearly and radically challenges the boundaries between experts and non-experts, and 
problematises the question of what counts as expertise and whose knowledge counts. This marks a 
contrast with representative and participatory expertise, each of which engage in weighing and 
scrutinising a range of expert claims with respect to their bearing on common problems, but are 
more limited in their capacities for challenging the construction of expert knowledge itself. To put 
the point another way, while we might characterise representative expertise and participatory 
expertise as responding to a set of concerns about the power and position of experts within policy 
structures, associative expertise responds more directly to concerns about the power of expert 
discourse itself (Fischer 2000). In such associational contexts it is common for experts to be 
working alongside directly affected people, which may influence their own conceptions of the 
boundaries of legitimate expertise and foster a more critical stance vis a vis official experts.   12
The second point is that associative expertise does not aim for impartiality. Rather, it is organised 
around group interests and mobilized in debates against other groups. Associative expertise can thus 
enable a closer and more dynamic relationship between citizens and experts than is the case for 
representative expertise (Callon et al. 2009, 34). At the systemic level this points toward a pluralist 
politics of expertise. Turner thus describes a shift from a model in which Ôpublic opinion [forms the] 
basis of a centralized sovereign legislature with a powerful (and largely self-sufficient with respect 
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.12
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to expert knowledge) bureaucracyÕ towards Ôa Tocquevillean form in which the bulk of ÒpoliticalÓ 
activity, that is to say the bulk of the rational persuasion, is done in intermediate bodies that the 
central state is compelled to respect and take seriously, because it has no self-sufficient alternative 
source of knowledge, and because these bodies have their own legitimacy as ÒexpertÓ or 
ÒknowledgeableÓÕ (Turner 2003, 79). The overt partiality of this way of organising citizen-expert 
relations marks a contrast also with participatory expertise, which is closely associated with the 
ideal of a general public (often constructed through mechanisms of random selection). Participatory 
expertise invokes Ñ and can even embody Ñ the logic of the expert as an Ôhonest brokerÕ of policy 
alternatives (Pielke 2007, 2); associative expertise supports the role of experts as Ôissue 
advocatesÕ (Pielke 2007, 2). 
Systemic Entanglements 
The practical public judgment of expertise Ñ involving both some degree of internal engagement 
with expert claims, and a process of scrutiny or contestation Ñ can thus be organised into 
democratic politics in very different ways. In the analysis so far I have focused on the ways in 
which these models make different cognitive demands on lay citizens, construe the epistemic 
contribution of those citizens in different ways, and employ different modalities of deliberation in 
the process of scrutinizing expert practices. In this section I want to focus on the systemic effects of 
these models and the ways in which they interact: How might these different ways of organising 
public judgment of expertise hang together? Do they support or complement one another? When, 
and how, might they come into tension? Such questions open up a large range of possibilities. I will 
attempt in this section to sketch some of the most important ways in which we might think of 
interactions and trade-offs between the modes of engagement supported by these different models.  
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The first tension I want to discuss involves the systemic effects of associative expertise. We have 
seen above that associative expertise is particularly well suited to incubating more radical 
challenges to expert discourses, contesting the boundaries between experts and non-experts, 
changing the agenda and framing of public problems, and even in shaping and producing new 
knowledge. Indeed, it seems clear that associative expertise is a better vehicle than participatory or 
representative expertise for some forms of epistemic inclusion, such as inclusion of the lay 
knowledge of their members even if such knowledge claims are not recognised by official experts 
or a mainstream expert consensus. In cases of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), for instance, 
where someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower, associations provide an organisational site 
for the articulation and development of their epistemic claims as well as developing the hermeneutic 
resources to make sense of specific problems, and can contribute to the co-production of expertise 
in the course of the discovery and definition of new public problems (Callon et al. 2009). The 
engagement between citizens and experts within associations, then, can contribute to the systemic 
good of challenging and contesting the assessments of experts in various contexts, with the effect of 
bringing out the normative stakes implicit in technical judgments and contributing to the shaping of 
specific decisions around thresholds of risk (as exemplified by the AIDS activists mentioned 
above). Yet at the systemic level there is a potential tension between the pluralistic and contestatory 
politics of knowledge associations and the idea of expertise concentrated in administration and 
guided by the collective will constructed through electoral institutions. A democratically authorised 
public policy on, say, immunization, might be countered and contested by an array of associations. 
The public constructed through the assertion of their diverse group interests could undermine the 
public constructed through the procedures of representative government. Bohman thus recognises 
that what I have called associative expertise amounts to a form of Ôdemocratization outside the 
representative stateÕ (Bohman 2000, 61), yet he does not clearly enough emphasise the potential for 
a real conflict and trade-off between them.  
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A closely related tension arising from critical contestation of expertise within civil society can be 
seen in relation to the good of informing public and political deliberation. It is common to frame the 
proper relation of expert knowledge to broader public deliberation in terms of the value of 
deference to a well-formed expert consensus. Deliberation and (reasonable) disagreement, as 
Christiano puts it, should reßect the Ôthe status quaestionis [state of investigation or scholarly 
consensus] in the relevant reliable scholarly disciplinesÕ (Christiano 2012: 31). The proper role of 
experts is to function as an Ôexternal filterÕ on the deliberations of citizens and politicians that Ôrules 
outÕ certain theories, leaving them to choose from the filtered set (Christiano 2012: 42). Deference 
to a consensus of experts in turn Ôpresumes a certain amount of trustÕ, as Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004, 146) put it. But, they add, Ônot blind trustÕ. Lay people should not Ôaccept these conclusions 
uncritically.Õ The tension here is that the practices of public contestation and scrutiny of expert 
claims can have collatoral damage with respect to the communication of a robust consensus of 
experts on a particular issue. Furthermore, the actors involved are aware of this, and may seek to 
strategically present consensus Ñ such activity has been documented in cases ranging from an 
expert committee advising on safe levels of radiation (Beatty 2006) to economists talking about 
trade policy, admitting behind closed doors to reservations, qualifications, ambiguities, uncertainties 
and disagreements that they would not present in public (Rodrik 2015, 65) Ñ or to strategically 
dispute an expert consensus in an attempt to manufacture doubt (Oreskes and Conway 2010).  This 13
tension is hard to escape, since one of the conditions of the trustworthy production of expert 
authority is a context in which at least some actors can Ñ and do Ñ challenge and contest those 
judgments such as to draw out justifications from those (putative) authorities (Warren 1996: 55). 
 These strategies can be related. One aspect of the scandal of Ôclimate-gateÕ, for instance, was that 13
climate scientists appeared to have been deliberately evading freedom of information requests from 
people they thought were intending to misrepresent their research (see Moore 2017, 136-145).
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Trustworthy expertise may depend on the presence of a critical public sphere whose activity is 
premissed on Ñ and can, intentionally or not, promote Ñ distrust. 
Participatory expertise can be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to respond to the perceived need 
for intermediaries capable of producing trustworthy judgments of the balance of expert opinion Ñ 
serving as an Ôhonest brokerÕ Ñ for wider publics. It is noteworthy that in this respect it is often 
explicitly deÞned against associative expertise. In the design of minipublics there is often an 
emphasis on identifying ÔpureÕ rather than ÔpartisanÕ publics (Braun and Schultz 2010), that is, 
citizens who are not already part of organised advocacy or interest groups with respect to the issue 
under discussion. The point of such exclusion is to prevent Ôintensive and well-organized interestsÕ 
from Ôswamp[ing] unorganized interests or latent public interestsÕ (MacKenzie and Warren 2012, 
108). Knowledge is crucial to the meaning of ÔorganisationÕ of interests in this context, and, 
speciÞcally, what is at stake are different ways of organising the citizensÕ role of judging knowledge 
claims and their bearing on complex policy questions. For instance, the CitizensÕ Initiative Review 
Ñ in which randomly selected citizens draw on expert assessments and examine competing claims 
in order to produce for the general public a balanced review of available evidence and arguments on 
a particular issue Ñ is explicitly designed to counter presentations of evidence made directly to the 
public by advocates and interest groups (Gastil et al. 2014). By testing and Þltering claims and 
drawing on carefully balanced and selected assessments of the current state of knowledge in 
particular domains, the participants in the process are able to exercise practical judgments about 
what the evidence does and does not support, and to communicate this judgment to a wider public. 
The role of minipublics can thus be described as that of a Ôtrust proxyÕ, in virtue of communicating 
to a wider public a collective judgment that can be trusted on the grounds that it was produced by a 
group that was both descriptively representative and technically competent with respect to the 
issues under discussion(MacKenzie and Warren 2012, 113). There remains an active debate over the 
question whether minipublics serve to augment and support wider public deliberations, or whether 
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they in fact represent an attempt to ÔbypassÕ public debate and democratic decision (Urbinati 2010, 
75), amounting to an illusory Ôshort cutÕ to the necessary improvement of the quality of deliberation 
in the broader public sphere (Lafont 2015), though to a great extent the answer to this question will 
depend on the particular context of application and the way in which minipublics are framed and 
conducted.
This does not, of course, exhaust the potential range of systemic interactions and tensions. 
However, it serves to illustrate the difÞculty of realising at the same time the various goals of 
generating robust critical scrutiny of experts, informing public deliberation with the best available 
expert knowledge, efÞciently and effectively realising democratically chosen ends, and opening 
space for the creation of new problem framings and challenging the boundaries of expert knowledge 
itself. It also shows the value of focusing on the ways in which expert-citizen relations are 
mediated. The importance of mediation is evident when we consider widespread calls for 
ÔtransparencyÕ as a means to open expertise up to public scrutiny (Beatty and Moore 2010, 211; 
Guston 2005, 401; Jasanoff 2003, 160; Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Setting aside the issue of the 
costs of transparency quite generally,  there are at least two further issues in relation to expertise. 14
One is that transparency can create incentives for the expert to act in a way that conforms to what 
the lay person regards as appropriate, rather than what the expert regards as the most effective 
action. If experts find themselves constrained to act in ways that are considered appropriate by an 
audience unfamiliar with the conditions of expert judgment, then we risk in effect replacing expert 
judgment with that of the non-expert audience, with detrimental effects on the quality of decisions 
 There are obviously material costs associated with compliance with Freedom of Information laws 14
or public audit requirements, but critics also claim that modes of monitoring and sanctions 
operating on the presumption of distrust can undermine the intrinsic motivations of public officials 
(Mansbridge 2009, 378-9; OÕNeill 2002, 19).
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(see Prat 2005). Another issue is that to the extent that expert knowledge involves tacit knowledge, 
in which you know how to do things without being able to fully explain how you are doing them, 
demands for transparency and openness risk weakening the expert judgment from which you hope 
to benefit by reducing it to that which can be made explicit. This is not to oppose calls for greater 
transparency in the production and communication of expertise,  but simply to highlight the 15
demands it puts on the recipients to process and judge those claims, something that is itself often a 
specialised activity. A great deal depends on the conduct and quality of the intermediaries and 
institutions through which justification and accountability are enacted.
Conclusion 
Political scientists are right to be anxious about questions of expert power in the government of 
complex societies. And political theorists are right to focus increasingly on knowledge as a political 
value. However, the tendency to discuss these issues in terms of a stylised distinction between 
ÔdemocracyÕ and some form of Ôrule by expertsÕ has hampered discussions of the value and dangers 
of expertise within practices of government, and the different possible ways in which expertise can 
be opened up to public judgment and influence. It is at least partly for this reason, I think, that 
democratic theorists have failed - as Dennis Thompson puts it - to show Ôhow to incorporate the 
need for expertise and technical administration in a deliberative democracyÕ (Thompson, 2008, 
515). This essay has attempted to analyse and compare a number of credible ways of integrating 
expertise in democratic systems, evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest some of the 
ways in which they might support or undermine one another. In presenting these models of 
democratic expertise, I have tried to isolate and clarify some of the different ways in which 
expertise can be integrated into democratic systems, so that when we encounter complex mixed 
situations we can do so with a sharper sense of what is at stake, and where particular tensions may 
 Though for such a critique, see John (2018).15
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emerge. Instead of a regime of Ôstraw guardiansÕ, we now have a more diverse repertoire of ways in 
which expertise can be integrated within central democratic practices. These models thus help to 
organise and clarify emerging debates about the democratic organisation of expertise in ways that 
go beyond crude invocations of the threat Ñ or the promise Ñ of Ôrule by expertsÕ.  
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